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I. INTRODUCTION
I came to the United States to study conflicts law in 1973, that is,
only two years after the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws' had
been officially published. That same year, a notable British author
had called the Restatement (Second) "the most impressive, comprehen-
sive and valuable work on the conflict of laws that has ever been pro-
duced in any country, in any language, at any time."'2 That was pretty
powerful stuff. Understandably, therefore, the Restatement (Second) be-
came one of the main objects of study in my struggle to understand
American conflicts law. I soon realized that the above author was vir-
tually alone among academics in his enthusiasm for the Restatement
(Second). Its reception by academic opinion in this country ranged
from lukewarm to hostile.' Among the criticisms were that the Restate-
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
2. J.H.C. Morris, Law and Reason Triumphant, or How Not to Review a Restatement, 21 AM.
J. ComP. L. 322, 330 (1973).
3. For early critiques of the Restatement (Second), see David F. Cavers, Re-Restating the
Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS
LAw 349 (Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts: Law and Reason
Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700 (1963); Robert Allen Sedler,
The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L.
REv. 279 (1972); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Le Second "Restatement" of the Conflict of Laws,
101 CLUNET 815 (1974); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodol-
ogy, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975); RussellJ. Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L. REV. 713 (1961). For foreign criti-
ques, see M. Bernard Audit, Le Second "Restatement" du Conflit de Lois aux Etats-Unis,
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ment (Second) was too much of a compromise among conflicting phi-
losophies, too vague, exceedingly elastic, unpredictable, directionless,
and rudderless. As one of the Restatement (Second)'s harshest critics put
it, "the [American Law] Institute, caught between its fundamentalist
heritage and realist scepticism, has sought a compromise between the
Revolution and the Establishment in Anarchy and Counter-
revolution. 4
Twenty-three years later, the Restatement (Second) seems to domi-
nate the American conflicts scene. At the same time, "anarchy" is the
word that most often comes to mind when reading contemporary
choice-of-law cases.' If this description is even partially accurate, it is
worth asking whether there is any correlation between the Restatement
(Second)'s apparent success in winning the hearts and minds of Ameri-
can judges and the current "anarchic" state of American conflicts law.
Can the Restatement (Second)'s drafters be blamed for this anarchy, if
that is what it is? To paraphrase a famous rhetorical question, "Are we
better off today than we were twenty-five years ago?" If the answer is
yes, is it because of, or despite, the Restatement (Second)? What has
been the overall contribution of the Restatement (Second) to the devel-
opment of American conflicts law? More importantly, where do we go
from here? These are some of the questions that I will try to address
in this Article.
TRAVAUX DU COMITt FRANAs: DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRrvt 29 (1977-79); Rodolfo de
Nova, Il "Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws," 10 Rrv. DIR. INT'LE PRIV. PROCES. 424 (1974);
Vischer, Das Neue Restatement "Conflict of Laws," 38 RABELSZ 128 (1974).
4. ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (1967) (citations omitted).
5. For six of the last ten years, I have had the dubious luck of being assigned by the
Conflicts Section of the Association of American Law Schools to the task of reading all
American choice-of-law cases decided every year and reporting on them to my colleagues.
In this assignment I must have read or perused at least five thousand cases. These reports
are published annually in the American Journal of Comparative Law. In chronological order,
the reports are: P. John Kozyris, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1987: An Overview,
36 AM.J. COMP. L. 547 (1988); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 1988, 37 AM.J. COMP. L. 457 (1989); P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 Am. J. COMP. L. 601 (1990); Larry
Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 465 (1991); Michael E. Solimine, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1991, 40
AM.J. COMP. L. 951 (1992); PatrickJ. Borchers, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1992:
Observations and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 125 (1994); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 1993 (and in the Six Previous Years), 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 599
(1994) [hereinafter Symeonides, Six Previous Years]; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law
in the American Courts in 1994: A View "From the Trenches," 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter Symeonides, From the Trenches]; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1995: A Year in Review, 44 AM.J. COMP. L. 181 (1996) [hereinafter Syme-
onides, A Year in Review]; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
1996: Tenth Annual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447 (1997) [hereinafter Symeonides, Tenth
Annual Survey].
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II. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICTs REVOLUTION AND THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESTATEMEFNT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LA Pw
To appreciate the contribution of the Restatement (Second) in shap-
ing contemporary American conflicts law, one must examine the chro-
nology of the American conflicts "revolution,"6 which has been largely
confined to the area of tort and contract conflicts.7 One result of this
revolution has been the abandonment of the traditional rules of ap-
plying the lex loci delicti to tort conflicts and the lex loci contractus to
contract conflicts. One way of determining the role of the Restatement
(Second) in this development is to examine the extent to which these
rules have been replaced by the approach provided in the Restatement
(Second) for tort and contract conflicts, respectively.
A. Tort Conflicts
Since the seminal case of Babcock v. Jackson8 in 1963, forty-one
American jurisdictions have abandoned the traditional rule of lex loci
delictiW in the chronological order shown in Chart 1 and documented
in Table 1 below.
6. The term conflicts "revolution" has been used widely to denote the intellectual
movement culminating in the 1960s that preached the demolition of the traditional
choice-of-law methodology which was embodied in the first RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAws (1934), and which had dominated American judicial practice and scholastic thinking
until then. Despite its rhetorical excessiveness, the term "revolution" will be used hereinaf-
ter without quotation marks as a convenient shorthand reference to all modem American
choice-of-law methodologies. The adjective "modern" is used here in its temporal rather
than its qualitative sense.
7. For this reason, this Article is confined to these two areas.
8. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). Babcock departed from the traditional choice-of-law
rule that the law of the place where the tort occurred is invariably controlling. In doing so,
the court relied both on a 1960 Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Second) and on the
"center-of-gravity" approach announced in Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954). Ear-
lier cases laid the ground, see, e.g., W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind.
1945) (adopting a significant-contacts approach for contract conflicts); Auten, 124 N.E.2d
at 101-03 (applying a grouping-of-contacts theory to a contract conflict, but also examining
the interests of the competing jurisdictions), but Babcock is generally considered as mark-
ing the beginning of the revolution.
9. This number includes the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. The remaining eleven jurisdictions that still adhere to the lex loci rule are listed in
Table 3, infra. For examples of federal courts applying the Restatement (Second), see infra
note 148 and accompanying text.
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CHART I
The Erosion of the Lex Loci Delicti Rule
. . . . . .
5 - t .. . . .. . . .. . -
20 . . . . . .- . - - -
15 .--.. .
10
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 S 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
E Restatement (Second)
U Significant Contacts
El Othem Modem Approaches
F] Lex Loci Delicti
TABLE 1. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF DEPARTURES FROM THE LAX
Loci DE-LicTi RULE
Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1963 New York
1 °
1964 Pennsylvania
1 1
1965 Wisconsin
1 2
1966 Puerto Rico
1 3  New Hampshire 1 4
10. See Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 285 (applying both interest analysis and center-of-gravity
approaches).
11. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964) (applying
interest analysis). Later decisions have adopted a mixed approached that includes interest
analysis as well as reliance on the Restatement (Second) and Professor Cavers's "principles of
preference." See, e.g., Miller v. Gay, 470 A.2d 1353, 1354-56 (Pa. 1984) (applying interest
analysis and the Restatement (Second)); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 856-57 (Pa. 1970)
(applying Cavers's "principles of preference").
12. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 415 (Wis. 1965) (adopting interest analysis).
Later cases have switched to Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. See, e.g., Lichter v.
Fritsch, 252 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Wis. 1977); Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Wis.
1967).
13. See Widow of Fornaris v. American Sur. Co., 93 P.R.R. 28, 46 (1966) (adopting a
"significant-contacts" or "dominant-contacts" approach).
14. See Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (N.H. 1966) (adopting Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations).
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Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1967 Kentucky, 15 Oregon, 1 6  California,
1 8 New Jersey 19
District of Columbia
1 7
1968 Alaska 20 Arizona,2 1  Rhode Island
2 4
Iowa,2R MissisSppi
2 3
1969 Missouri
2
1970 Illinois,
2 6 Maine 2 7
1971
1972 North Dakota
2 8
1973 Colorado 2 9  Louisiana,3
° Minnesota g t
1974 Oklahoma,
3 2
Washington
3 3
1975
1976 Massachusetts
3 4
15. See Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 259-61 (Ky. 1967) (adopting the Restatement
(Second) for cases in which its application would yield a clear result). One year later, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky abandoned this approach in favor of the lexfoni approach in
Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Ky. 1968).
16. See Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898, 907 (Or. 1967) (adopting
the Restatement (Second)). Later cases abandoned the Restatement (Second) in favor of a
mixed approach that includes reliance on the Restatement (Second).
17. See Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 583 (D.C. 1967). Later cases have applied
interest analysis. See, e.g., Rong Yao Zhou v.Jennifer Mall Restauraunt, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268,
1270 (D.C. 1987).
18. See Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730-31 (Cal. 1967) (applying interest analysis).
19. See Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625, 629-30 (N.J. 1967) (applying interest analysis).
20. See Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, Ltd., 705 P.2d 446, 453 (Alaska
1985) (relying exclusively on the Restatement (Second)); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d
699, 701-03 (Alaska 1968) (relying partly on the Restatement (Second)).
21. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254, 257 (Ariz. 1968).
22. See Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1968).
23. See Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 515 (Miss. 1968).
24. See Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (R.I. 1968) (adopting Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations).
25. See Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
26. See Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ill. 1970).
27. See Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 616 (Me. 1970); see also Adams v. Buffalo
Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 934 (Me. 1982) (reiterating the court's adoption of the
Restatement (Second)).
28. See Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972) (adopting a significant-
contacts approach).
29. See First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 320 (Colo. 1973) (en banc).
30. SeeJagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 311-13 (La. 1973) (resolving a false
conflict through interest analysis, but also quoting the Restatement (Second)).
31. See Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 1973) (adopting Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations).
32. See Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 637 (Okla. 1974).
33. SeeJohnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 1000 (Wash. 1976); Werner v.
Werner, 526 P.2d 370, 376 (Wash. 1974) (en banc).
34. See Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416, 418 (Mass. 1976) (creating exceptions to the
lex loci delicti rule but later interpreted as having endorsed the Restatement (Second)).
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Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1977 Arkansas
3 5
1978
1979 Texas
3 6
1980 Florida
3 7
1981 Hawaii
3 8
1982 Michigan
3 9
1983
1984 Ohio
4 0
1985 Idaho
4 1
1986 Connecticut
4 2
1987 Nebraska 4
3  Indiana 4 4
1988
1989 Utah
45
1990
1991 Delaware
4 6
1992 South Dakota
4 7
Tennessee4A
1993
1994
1995
1996 Nevada
49
Subsequent decisions follow a mixed approach that includes reliance on the Restatement
(Second). See infra note 139.
35. See Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 458-59 (Ark. 1977) (in banc)
(adopting Leflar's choice-influencing considerations).
36. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979).
37. See Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980).
38. See Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586, 593-94 (Haw. 1981) (applying a blend of interest
analysis and Leflar's choice-influencing considerations).
39. See Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 857 (Mich. 1982)
(adopting the lexfori approach).
40. See Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ohio 1984).
41. SeeJohnson v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19, 22 (Idaho 1985).
42. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 21-22 (Conn. 1986) (adopting the
Restatement (Second) "for those cases in which application of the doctrine of lex loci [delicti]
would produce an arbitrary, irrational result").
43. See Crossley v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 251 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Neb. 1977) (relying
alternatively on the Restatement (Second) and the lex loci delicti with the same result); Harper
v. Silva, 399 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Neb. 1987) (interpreting Crossley as having adopted the
Restatement (Second)).
44. See Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Ind. 1987) (holding
that "when the place of the tort is an insignificant contact," the court will turn to the
Restatement (Second), but stopping short of embracing the policy-analysis component of the
Restatement (Second) or of abandoning the lex loci rule in general).
45. See Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah 1989).
46. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 47 (Del. 1991).
47. See Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63, 67 (S.D. 1992).
48. See Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992).
49. See Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc., 921 P.2d 933, 935 (Nev. 1996) (adopting a lexfori
approach in tort cases unless "another State has an overwhelming interest").
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Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1997 Vermont 5 0
Total 25 3 13
As Table 1 indicates, of the forty-one jurisdictions that have aban-
doned the lex loci delicti rule for tort conflicts, twenty-five jurisdictions
originally adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second), three juris-
dictions originally adopted the kindred "significant contacts" ap-
proach, 1 and thirteen jurisdictions originally adopted another
approach, such as governmental interest analysis, Professor Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations, the lexfori approach, or a combina-
tion of these approaches (which will be referred to as the "mixed ap-
proach"), with or without reliance on the Restatement (Second).52 Thus,
one could say that the Restatement (Second) has merely filled much of
the vacuum left by the abandonment of the lex loci delicti rule, or one
could say that the Restatement (Second) has contributed greatly to per-
suading American courts to abandon that rule. I believe that the lat-
ter statement is closer to the truth.
B. Contract Conflicts
In contract conflicts, forty-two jurisdictions have abandoned the
lex loci contractus rule in the chronological order shown in Chart 2 and
documented in Table 2 below.5 3
50. See Amiot v. Ames, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (Vt. 1997).
51. The "significant-contacts" approach is also referred to as "grouping of contacts" or
.center of gravity."
52. See infra notes 137-146 and accompanying text.
53. Again, included in the forty-two jurisdictions are the District of Columbia and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The remaining ten jurisdictions that still adhere to the lex
loci contractus rule are listed in Table 4, infra,
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CHART 2
The Erosion of the Lex Loci Contractus Rule
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[ Lex Loci Contractus
TABLE 2. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF DEPARTURES FROM THE LEx
Loc1 CoA,7TRA CTLuS RuLE
Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1945 Indiana
5 4
1954 New York
5 5
1961 Puerto Rico
5 6
1964 Oregon
5 7
54. See W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. 1945) (following a
significant-contacts approach), discussed in Geri J. Yonover, The Golden Anniversary of the
Choice of Law Revolution: Indiana Fired the First Shot, 29 IND. L. REv. 1201 (1996). Among
recent cases, see Dohm & Nelke v. Wilson Foods Corp., 531 N.E.2d 512, 513 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988) (applying a significant-contacts approach); Barrow v. ATCO Mfg. Co., 524 N.E.2d
1313, 1314-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (following a significant-contacts approach, but also
relying on the Restatement (Second)).
55. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101 (N.Y. 1954) (adopting the center-of-gravity
approach). Later cases have combined this approach with interest analysis. See infta note
144.
56. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. San Juan Racing Ass'n, 83 P.R.R. 538 (1961) (adopting a
significant-contacts approach); see also Green Giant Co. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 P.R. Dec.
489 (1975).
57. See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 549 (Or. 1964) (adopting interest
analysis).
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Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1967 Washington 5 8  California
5 9
1968 Idaho, New Wisconsin
6 3
Hampshire,
6 1
Vermont
6 2
1969 District of Columbia
6 4
1970 Arizona,
6 5
Delaware
6 6
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 Iowa,
6 7 Kentucky6 8
58. See Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 425 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Wash.
1967) (en banc) (relying on a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) in adopting a most-
significant-relationship test).
59. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 434 P.2d 992, 994
(Cal. 1967) (applying interest analysis). Later cases have also relied in part on the
Restatement (Second).
60. See Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 449 P.2d 378, 382 (Idaho 1968).
61. See Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Radio Foods Corp., 240 A.2d 47, 49 (N.H. 1968).
62. See Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 245 A.2d 891, 894 (Vt. 1968) (relying in part on
§ 188 of the Restatement (Second) but not actually applying it). Later cases have assumed
adoption of the Restatement (Second). See, e.g., Amiot v. Ames, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (Vt. 1997).
63. See Urhammer v. Olson, 159 N.W.2d 688, 689 (Wis. 1968) (adopting a grouping-of-
contacts approach). Later cases have abandoned that approach in favor of Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations. See Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 271 N.W.2d 879, 885-86
(Wis. 1978); Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 177 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Wis. 1970).
64. See McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917, 921 (D.C. 1969) (taking an
interest-analysis approach). Later cases have adopted a mixed approach. See, e.g., District
of Columbia Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 565 A.2d 564 (D.C. App. 1989) (per
curiam) (combining interest analysis with the Restatement (Second)); Owen v. Owen, 427
A.2d 933, 937 (D.C. 1981) (following a mixed approach-described as a search for the
"more substantial interest," but reduced to contact counting).
65. See Burr v. Renewal Guar. Corp., 468 P.2d 576, 577 (Ariz. 1970).
66. See Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 394 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Del.
1978) (relying in part on § 188 of the Restatement (Second)).
67. SeeJoseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., 258 N.W.2d 317, 327 (Iowa 1977).
68. See Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Ky. 1977).
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Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1978 Missouri6 9  Minnesota
70
1979 Colorado,
7 1  Arkansas7 3
Illinois
7 2
1980 Mississippi New Jersey
7 5
1981
1982
1983 Maine 7 6  Pennsylvania7 7
1984 Ohio, 7 8 Texas7 9
1985 Massachusetts 8 1
1986 North Dakota8 1
69. See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978). Although the Missouri Supreme Court has not expressly adopted the Restatement
(Second) for contract conflicts, the court has declined to review the several lower court cases
that have consistently applied the Restatement (Second) to such conflicts. See, e.g., Hartzler v.
American Family Mut. Ins., 881 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (applying the
Restatement (Second) to contract conflict); Protective Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 734 S.W.2d 898,
905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (applying the Restatement (Second) to insurance contract dispute);
Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 716 S.W.2d 348, 358 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (adopting the Restatement (Second) in casualty insurance cases, if it "is not
adopted already by implication").
70. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 48-49 (Minn. 1979) (applying Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations).
71. See Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 601 P.2d 1369, 1372
(Colo. 1979) (en banc).
72. See Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 395 N.E.2d 990, 997 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979). Although Illinois's highest court has not yet encountered a contract conflict, the
court has not disturbed the holdings of several intermediate courts that have consistently
interpreted Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. 1970), see supra tbl.1 note 26, as having
adopted the Restatement (Second) for contract conflicts. See, e.g., Olsen v. Celano, 600 N.E.2d
1257, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that the most-significant-contacts test applies to
contract conflicts); Illinois Tool Works v. Sierracin Corp., 479 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (applying the Restatement (Second) to contract conflict and characterizing the
Restatement (Second) approach as a "'most significant contacts' test").
73. See Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Ark.
1979) (applying a significant-contacts approach).
74. See Boardman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024, 1032-33 (Miss. 1985);
Spragins v. Louise Plantation, Inc., 391 So. 2d 97 (Miss. 1980).
75. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d 488, 493 (N.J.
1980) (adopting a mixed approach).
76. See Baybutt Constr. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 918-19 (Me.
1983).
77. See Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 753 (Pa. 1983) (stating that Pennsylvania has
adopted a mixed approach that includes reliance on the Restatement (Second)).
78. See Gries Sports Enters. v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807, 810 (Ohio 1984).
79. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex.), judgment rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. 1984).
80. See Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 668-69 (Mass. 1985)
(adopting a mixed approach).
81. SeeApollo Sprinkler Co. v. Fire Sprinkler Suppliers & Design, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 386,
390 (N.D. 1986) (adopting a mixed approach).
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Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
1987 Wyoming
8 2
1988 West Virginia 83  N. Carolina
8 4  Hawaii8 5
1989
1990
1991 Oklahoma
8 6
1992 Louisiana
8 7
1993
1994 Connecticut,
8 8  Nevada 9 2
Montana,
8 9
82. See Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter, 733 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wyo. 1987) (citing the
Restatement (Second) favorably but relying mostly on the "reasonable forum relationship"
language of Wyoming's version of the U.C.C.); Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7
F.3d 909, 920 (10th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Cheny Creek as having adopted the Restatement
(Second) for contract conflicts).
83. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not adopted the Restatement
(Second) for contracts in general but has drawn heavily from it in insurance contract
conflicts. See Cannelton Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of America, 460 S.E.2d 1 (W.
Va. 1994); Adkins v. Sperry, 437 S.E.2d 284 (W. Va. 1993); Clark v. Rockwell, 435 S.E.2d
664 (W. Va. 1993); Nadler v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 424 S.E.2d 256 (W. Va. 1992); Lee
v. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1988); see also New v. Tac & C Energy, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 629
(W. Va. 1987) (applying § 196 of the Restatement (Second) to an employment contract).
84. See Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1988) (interpreting the phrase
.appropriate relation" in the forum's version of U.C.C. art. 1-105 as being equivalent to the
phrase "most significant relationship" as used in the Restatement (Second)).
85. See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988) (contract conflict interpreting Peters
v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Haw. 1981), a tort conflict, as having adopted a significant-
relationship test-also applicable to contracts-with primary emphasis on the state with
the "strongest interest").
86. See Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 820 P.2d 787, 797 (Okla. 1991) (stating that the
court would be willing to apply the law of a state other than that of the locus contractus upon
a showing that such other state "has the most significant relationship with the subject
matter and the parties"). Many commentators believe that Oklahoma should be listed as a
lex loci contractus state, however, because an Oklahoma statute, although often disregarded,
compels adherence to that approach. See Symeonides, From the Trenches, supra note 5, at 3
n.6.
87. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. arts. 3537-40 (West 1994) (enacted in 1992) (providing
rules based on the notion that the applicable law should be the law of that state whose
policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied).
88. See Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 783 (Conn. 1994).
89. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), judgment rev'd on other
grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
90. See Powell v. American Charter Fed. S & L Ass'n, 514 N.W.2d 326 (Neb. 1994)
(explicitly adopting the Restatement (Second)). An earlier case, Shull v. Dain, Kalman &
Quail, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 517 (Neb. 1978), had also applied the Restatement (Second). Id. at
520-21.
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Significant
Year Restatement (Second) Contacts Approach Other Approaches
Nebraska,9 0 South
Dakota
9 1
1995 Alaska,
9 3
Michigan
9 4
1996 Utah
9 5
Total 25 6 11
As Table 2 indicates, of the forty-two jurisdictions that have aban-
doned the lex loci contractus rule, twenty-five originally adopted the Re-
statement (Second), six originally adopted the kindred significant-
contacts approach, and eleven originally adopted a mixed approach,
with or without reliance on the Restatement (Second). Again, one could
say that the Restatement (Second) has simply filled the vacuum left by the
abandonment of the lex loci contractus rule, or one could say that the
Restatement (Second) was instrumental in the abandonment of that rule.
I believe that the latter is true. In fact, if one were to focus on con-
tracts containing a choice-of-law clause,9 6 the contribution of the Re-
statement (Second) in abandoning the traditional theory is undeniable
and major.
91. See Stockmen's Livestock Exch. v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1994) (per
curiam).
92. See Hermanson v. Hermanson, 887 P.2d 1241 (Nev. 1994) (adopting a "substantial
relationship test").
93. See Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chem. Co., 904 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Alaska 1995)
(interpreting Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, Ltd., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska
1985), supra tbl.1 note 20, a case involving a tort conflict, as having adopted the Restatement
(Second) for contract conflicts as well).
94. See Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. 1995).
95. See American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186 (Utah 1996).
96. Unlike the First Restatement, the Restatement (Second) assigns a major role to party
autonomy in selecting the law applicable to contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
FUCT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Section 187 of the Restatement (Second), which defines the
limits of party autonomy, has had an almost universal appeal among courts and has been
followed even in states that do not follow the Restatement (Second) in other respects. See, e.g.,
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502, 507-08 (Ala. 1991) (relying on Restate-
ment (Second) § 187 even though Alabama follows the traditional rules in both contract and
tort conflicts); Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1150-56 (Cal. 1992)
(relying on § 187 of the Restatement (Second) even though in other conflicts California fol-
lows a combination of interest analysis with comparative impairment); National Glass, Inc.
v. J.C. Penney Properties, Inc., 650 A.2d 246, 248-51 (Md. 1994) (relying on Restatement
(Second) § 187 even though Maryland follows the traditional rules in both contract and tort
conflicts); Kronovet v. Lipchin, 415 A.2d 1096, 1106 (Md. 1980) (same); Prows v. Pinpoint
Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1993) (relying on Restatement (Second) § 187
before Utah adopted the Restatement (Second) for other contractual issues).
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III. THE JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE Restatement (Second) to Date
How many of the above jurisdictions still adhere to the Restatement
(Second)? Where do the other jurisdictions stand today? These ques-
tions are answered by Tables 3 and 4, below, for tort and contract
conflicts, respectively.9 7 Before reading these tables, however, three
warnings or caveats are in order: First, pigeonholing states into meth-
odological camps is inherently difficult and can be the object of disa-
greement among reasonable people; second, such a tabular
pigeonholing cannot show the degree of a state's commitment to a
particular methodology; and third, adherence to a particular method-
ology may be only marginally relevant in explaining the result reached
in actual cases.
A. Caveats
1. Classification Problems.-As has been explained elsewhere, the
classification of states within one or another methodological camp is
not an exact science.9" In some choice-of-law cases, the existing prece-
dents are equivocal or even irreconcilable. For example, the prece-
dents from North Carolina,99 Oklahoma,"'0 West Virginia, t0 1 and
Wyoming' 0 2 are susceptible to different interpretations and thus raise
legitimate doubts as to whether these states properly belong in the
Restatement (Second) column.1" 3
In other cases, there is simply no recent state supreme court pre-
cedent. For example, the supreme courts of Illinois and Missouri
have yet to decide a contract conflict after having adopted the Restate-
97. For other classifications of jurisdictions according to conflicts methodology, see
PatrickJ. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. REV.
357, 367-76 (1992); Herma H. Kay, Theory into Practice, Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER
L. REv. 521, 591-92 (1983); Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 1041, 1172-74 (1987); Symeonides, Six Previous Years, supra note 5, at 600-12; Symeo-
nides, A Year in Review, supra note 5, at 193-203.
98. See Symeonides, A Year in Review, supra note 5, at 193-97.
99. See supra tbl.2 note 84.
100. See supra tbl.2 note 86.
101. See supra tbl.2 note 83.
102. See supra tbl.2 note 82.
103. Similarly, Arkansas's classification as a significant-contacts state for contract con-
flicts is not entirely safe. In both McMillen v. Winona National & Savings Bank, 648 S.W.2d
460, 462 (Ark. 1983), and Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 181,
184 (Ark. 1979), the Arkansas Supreme Court applied a significant-contacts approach. In
Stacy v. St. Charles Custom Kitchens, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Ark. 1985), however, the court
seems to revert to the lex loci contractus rule. Writing in 1987, one commentator classified
Arkansas as a First Restatement (lex loci contractus) state. See Smith, supra note 97, at 1053-55,
1172. In Threlkeld v. Worsham, 785 S.W.2d 249 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990), a lower court applied
the "better-law" approach to a sale contract. Id. at 252-53.
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ment (Second) for tort conflicts in 1970 and 1969, respectively. 10 4 Never-
theless, because these courts' endorsements of the Restatement (Second)
for tort conflicts have been wholehearted, and because these courts
have also failed to disturb the several lower court decisions that have
applied the Restatement (Second) to contract conflicts,'0 5 it seems rea-
sonable and safe to classify these two states in the Restatement (Second)
column for contract conflicts. 10 6
Perhaps the same should be done for the state of Tennessee. The
Tennessee Supreme Court has not encountered a contract conflict
since its 1992 abandonment of the traditional theory in tort con-
flicts.1" 7 Because the court's endorsement of the Restatement (Second)
in tort conflicts was wholehearted, it may be only a matter of time
before that court adopts the Restatement (Second) for contract conflicts
as well. Nevertheless, it is better to err on the side of caution and to
keep Tennessee in the traditional column for contract conflicts.0 8
The above are only some of the examples of the difficulties en-
countered in any attempt to draw bright demarcation lines between
the various methodological camps. Because of these difficulties, it
would not be surprising if some readers disagree about the placement
of a particular state in a particular column in Tables 3 and 4, below.
Despite the potential for difference of opinion regarding individual
states, however, there will likely be less disagreement on the overall
count at the end of each column.
2. Gradations of Commitment to the Restatement (Second).-The
second caveat about tables like the ones reproduced below is that they
give the misleading impression that all of the jurisdictions listed in the
Restatement (Second) column share an equal commitment to the Restate-
ment (Second). Yet even a cursory reading of the cases suggests other-
wise. For example, some cases use the Restatement (Second) solely as an
escape from a traditional choice-of-law rule that coexists with the Re-
statement (Second).1 ° 9 Some cases use the Restatement (Second) as a cam-
104. See supra tbl.1 note 25 (Missouri) and note 26 (Illinois).
105. See supra tbl.2 note 69 (Missouri) and note 72 (Illinois).
106. See infra tbl.4.
107. See supra tbl.1 note 48.
108. See infra tbl.4.
109. See, e.g., O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 21 (Conn. 1986) (adopting the Re-
statement (Second) "for those cases in which application of the doctrine of lex loci [delicti]
would produce an arbitrary, irrational result"); Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d
1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987) (holding that, "when the place of the tort is an insignificant con-
tact," the court will turn to the Restatement (Second)).
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ouflage for a "grouping-of-contacts" approach,"' while other cases
use it as a vehicle for merely restraining but not avoiding interest anal-
ysis."' Moreover, examples of such disparate treatment of the Restate-
ment (Second) can often be found in the same jurisdiction.1 2
3. The Marginal Relevance of Methodology.-The final caveat about
these tables is that they may give the impression that methodology is
more important than it actually is in explaining choice-of-law deci-
sions. Academics tend to take methodology seriously, as perhaps we
should. Choice-of-law chapters in some casebooks are organized by
methodology rather than by subject matter," 3 and many of us teach
that way. I would not argue that methodology should not matter,
either in the way in which we teach our students or in the way in
which we try to hone our own thinking about choice of law. At the
same time, the reality of the case law cannot be ignored. That reality
suggests that methodology plays a relatively minor role in explaining
the results in actual cases. As one other observer put it, "the result in
the case often appears to have dictated the judge's choice of law ap-
proach at least as much as the approach itself generated the result."1
14
110. See, e.g., Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chem. Co., 904 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1995);
Powell v. American Charter Fed. S & L Ass'n, 514 N.W.2d 326 (Neb. 1994); Stockmen's
Livestock Exch. v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1994) (per curiam); Selle v. Pierce,
494 N.W.2d 634 (S.D. 1992); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992); American
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186 (Utah 1996); Forsman v. Forsman,
779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989).
111. See, e.g., Williams v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 783 (Conn. 1994);
O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13 (Conn. 1986); Esser v. McIntire, 661 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill.
1996); Nelson v. Hix, 522 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. 1988); Veasley v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 553 N.W.2d
896 (Iowa 1996); Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 698 (Mich.
1995); Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993).
112. Compare Stockmen's Livestock Exchange v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1994)
(per curiam), and Selle v. Pierce, 494 N.W.2d 634 (S.D. 1992), both of which relied more on
state contacts than on state interests, with Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63
(S.D. 1992), which relied more on state interests and less on state contacts.
113. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1995);
ROGER CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS (5th ed. 1993);
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAws: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (1986); GARvJ. SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF LAwS, CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 1997); DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAws: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS (1990).
114. Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REv.
949, 951 (1994); see also Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 468
(Mich. 1997) ("[I]n practice, all the modem approaches to conflicts of law are relatively
uniform in the results they produce."); Sterk, supra, at 962 ("[C]itation to academic theory
has served more as window dressing than as a dispositive factor in deciding choice of law
cases.").
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B. The Numbers
In any event, none of the above caveats should render useless the
chart and tables reproduced below. The caveats simply suggest that
these tables should be read with appropriate caution. Despite these
caveats, the tables are fairly accurate portrayals of the Restatement (Sec-
ond)'s position in the contemporary American conflicts landscape.1 15
CHART 3
THE METHODOLOGICAL CAMPS IN 1997: TORT CONFLICTS
AND CONTRACT CONFLICTS
Tort Conflicts
Contract Conflicts
115. For maps showing the geographical distribution of the Restatement (Second) states,
see Symeonides, A Year in Review, supra note 5, at 195-96.
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TABLE 3. THE METHODOLOGICAL CAMPS IN 1997: TORT CONFLICTS
Significant Zs7A 7TEmEAF Interest
Traditional Contacts (SECOND) Analysis Lex Fori Better Law Mixed
Alabama Indiana Alaska California Kentucky Arkansas Hawaii
Georgia N. Dakota Arizona Dist. of Colum. Michigan Minnesota Louisiana
Kansas Puerto Rico Colorado New Jersey Nevada New Hamp. Massachusetts
Maryland Connecticut Rhode Isl. New York
Montana Delaware Wisconsin Oregon
New Mex. Florida Pennsylvania
N. Carolina Idaho
S. Carolina Illinois
Virginia Iowa
W. Virginia Maine
Wyoming Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Ohio
Oklahoma
S. Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Washington
Total 11 3 21 3 3 5 6
TABLE 4
THE METHODOLOGICAL CAMPS IN 1997: CONTRACT CONFLICTS
Significant RESTATEMAEAT
Traditional Contacts (SEcoND) Interest Analysis Lex Foi Better Law Mixed
Alabama Arkansas Alaska Minnesota California
Dist. of
Florida Indiana Arizona Wisconsin Colum.
Georgia Nevada Colorado Hawaii
Kansas N. Carolina Connecticut Louisiana
Maryland? Puerto Rico Delaware Massachusetts
New Mex. Idaho New Jersey
Rhode Isl. Illinois New York
S. Carolina Iowa N. Dakota
Tennessee Kentucky Oregon
Virginia Maine Pennsylvania
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Ohio
Oklahoma
S. Dakota
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Washington
W. Virginia
W. Virginia Wyoming
Total 10 5 25 0 0 2 10
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C. Restatement (Second) States
As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, as of December 1997, twenty-one juris-
dictions follow the Restatement (Second) in tort conflicts and twenty-five
do so in contract conflicts. 16 With regard to tort conflicts, these num-
bers are lower by four than the numbers shown in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) column in Table 1.117 This is because some states that had
initially adopted the Restatement (Second) have since moved to a differ-
ent methodological camp. Thus, Kentucky has moved to the lex for
camp,11 the District of Columbia has moved to the interest analysis
camp,' 1 9 and Oregon and Massachusetts have moved to the mixed
approach camp.1 2' The reverse movement has not occurred. No state
has abandoned a "modern" approach to adopt exclusively the Restate-
ment (Second).1 2 1 In contract conflicts, however, two jurisdictions have
abandoned interest analysis in favor of a mixed approach that in-
cludes either the Restatement (Second) or a significant-contacts
approach.'
22
D. States That Follow the Restatement (Second) in Tort or Contract
Conflicts Only
Tables 1 and 2, above, show that many of the jurisdictions that
have adopted the Restatement (Second) have done so first for tort con-
flicts and then for contract conflicts, 123 apparently because tort con-
flicts are more frequent and because many contract conflicts depend
on local statutes124 Similarly, Tables 3 and 4, above, show that some
116. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
117. See supra tbl.1.
118. See supra tbl.1 note 15 and tbl.3.
119. See supra tbl.1 note 17 and tbl.3.
120. See supra tbl.1 notes 16 (Oregon), 34 (Massachusetts) and tbl.3. On the other
hand, Michigan, which had adopted the lex Jor approach for tort conflicts, but had not
applied that approach to contract conflicts, eventually adopted the Restatement (Second) for
contract conflicts. See supra tbl.1 note 39 and tbl.2 note 94, respectively.
121. See supra tbl.1 notes 10-50, tbl.2 notes 54-95, tbls.3 and 4.
122. These jurisdictions are California and the District of Columbia. See supra tbl.2
notes 59 (California), 64 (District of Columbia). Similarly, Wisconsin, which had initially
adopted the significant-contacts approach, has since switched to Professor Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations. See supra tbl.2 note 63.
123. The following fifteen states first adopted the Restatement (Second) for torts and then
for contract conflicts: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. See
supra tbls.1 and 2.
124. Four states, Delaware, Idaho, Vermont, and Washington, first adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) for contract conflicts and then for tort conflicts. See supra tbls.1 and 2. One
state, Ohio, adopted the Restatement (Second) for tort and contract conflicts in the same year
on the same day. See supra tbl.1 note 40 and tbl.2 note 78.
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jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) for torts but not for
contracts. 12 5 These states are Florida126 and Tennessee. 127 With re-
gard to Florida, this is a matter of deliberate choice. After adopting
the Restatement (Second) for tort conflicts, Florida's highest court had
several opportunities to do likewise for contract conflicts, but specifi-
cally refused to do so. 128 In contrast, Tennessee has not had this op-
portunity. The Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the Restatement
(Second) for tort conflicts only recently,129 but has not since encoun-
tered a contract conflict.
Similarly, six states-Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, West Virginia, and Wyoming-have adopted the Restatement (Sec-
ond) for contract conflicts but not for tort conflicts.' 3 ° Kentucky at
first abandoned the traditional theory in tort conflicts in favor of the
Restatement (Second),' but one year later opted for the lex fori ap-
proach in another tort conflict. 13 2 Many years later, when that state's
highest court encountered a contract conflict, the court found that its
earlier adoption of the Restatement (Second) was appropriate for con-
tract conflicts. 33 In Michigan, the reverse sequence was followed. In
1982, the Michigan Supreme Court first abandoned the traditional
theory for tort conflicts in favor of the lex for approach,13 4 and for
many years it did not encounter a contract conflict. In 1995, when the
court encountered such a conflict, the court opted for the Restatement
(Second) for contract conflicts,' 35 perhaps because by that time the
novelty of the lex for approach had worn off. The remaining four
states simply have not had the opportunity to consider the Restatement
(Second) for tort conflicts.
125. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
126. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
127. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
128. See, e.g., Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1988).
129. See supra tbl.1 note 48.
130. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
131. See Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 259-61 (Ky. 1967) (adopting the Restatement
(Second) for cases in which its application would yield a clear result).
132. See Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Ky. 1968); see also Foster v. Leggett,
484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972).
133. See Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Ky. 1977) (adopt-
ing the Restatement (Second) for contract conflicts); see also Bonnlander v. Leader Nat'l Ins.
Co., 949 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. 1977) (rejecting plaintiffs' reliance on the lexfori approach
in a contract conflict).
134. See supra tbl.1 note 39.
135. See Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Mich. 1995).
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E. States That Rely Partly on the Restatement (Second)
Tables 3 and 4 also show that three jurisdictions follow the signifi-
cant-contacts approach for tort conflicts and five do so for contract
conflicts.13 6 This approach is largely based on or resembles the Re-
statement (Second). In addition, of the jurisdictions that are listed in the
mixed-approach column,1 37 Hawaii,13 8 Massachusetts,1 39 Oregon,14 °
and Pennsylvania"' rely in part on the Restatement (Second) for tort and
contract conflicts, while California,14 2 the District of Columbia,
14 3
New York,1 44 New Jersey,"' 5 and North Dakota' 4 6 do so with regard to
contract conflicts.
F The Dominance of the Restatement (Second)
To date, a plurality of twenty-one jurisdictions follow the Restate-
ment (Second) in tort conflicts and twenty-five do so in contract con-
136. See supra tbls.3 and 4. These jurisdictions are Indiana, North Dakota, and Puerto
Rico for tort conflicts and Arkansas, Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina, and Puerto Rico for
contract conflicts. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
137. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
138. Hawaii follows a combination of interest analysis, the Restatement (Second), and Le-
flar's choice-influencing considerations. See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Haw.
1988) (interpreting an earlier Hawaii case, Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (1981), as having
adopted a "significant relationship" test with primary emphasis on the state with the
'stronger interest"). Borchers classifies Hawaii as an interest analysis state, see Borchers,
supra note 97, at 371, whereas Smith classifies Hawaii as a state that follows Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations. See Smith, supra note 97, at 1067-68.
139. Massachusetts follows a combination of interest analysis, "functional analysis," and
the Restatement (Second). See Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 668-69
(Mass. 1985).
140. Oregon follows a combination of interest analysis and the Restatement (Second)
"'coupled with an almost irresistible forum presumption.'" Symeonides, From the Trenches,
supra note 5, at 3 n.6 (quoting Professor James Nafziger).
141. Pennsylvania follows a combination of interest analysis and the Restatement (Second),
but also draws from Professor Cavers's principles of preference. See supra tbl.1 note 11 and
tbl.2 note 77.
142. See Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (Cal. 1992) (rely-
ing heavily on the Restatement (Second) but without abandoning interest analysis).
143. See District of Columbia Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 565 A.2d 564, 568
n.2 (D.C. 1989) (per curiam) (using a combined interest analysis and Restatement (Second)
approach).
144. New York follows interest analysis combined with a significant-contacts analysis in
contract conflicts. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (N.Y. 1993).
145. See Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885, 893-94
(N.J. 1993) (combining interest analysis with the Restatement (Second)).
146. North Dakota follows a combination of interest analysis, the Restatement (Second),
and Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. See Starry v. Central Dakota Printing, Inc.,
530 N.W.2d 323, 325-26 (N.D. 1995); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
504 N.W.2d 307, 308-09 (N.D. 1993).
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flicts. 14 7  If one adds the jurisdictions that follow the kindred
approach of significant contacts and the jurisdictions that follow the
Restatement (Second) in part, this plurality becomes a majority. In addi-
tion, if one keeps in mind that the Restatement (Second) is followed by
many federal courts in federal question cases, 148 the domination of
the Restatement (Second) becomes even more apparent. In light of the
many early criticisms the Restatement (Second) encountered, this is no
small accomplishment for its drafters. I am sure that Willis Reese, the
Restatement (Second)'s chief drafter, who is no longer with us, is looking
down upon us with that familiar, somewhat mischievous smile.
Two obvious questions are: Why has the Restatement (Second) en-
joyed such a success; and is that success good or bad for American
conflicts law? These questions are addressed in the next two sections.
IV. REASONS FOR THE RA7STAT 7ME-AT (SECOND)'S APPEAL TO JUDGES
Why has the Restatement (Second) enjoyed such a success in win-
ning the hearts and minds of most American judges? The reasons are
many and varied, and some of them are not necessarily complimen-
tary. They include the following:
A. The Restatement (Second) Provides the Judge with Virtually
Unlimited Discretion
Of the 423 sections of the Restatement (Second), all of which are
printed in "black letter," only a handful contain anything that comes
close to qualifying as a black letter rule in the sense of a rule that is
not subject to exceptions. All of these sections are confined to prop-
erty and succession issues, 149 which are outside the scope of this Arti-
147. See supra tbls.3 and 4.
148. See, e.g., Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 83 F.3d 127, 130-31 (6th Cir.) (applying the
Restatement (Second) to a case arising under the Warsaw Convention), superseded on other
grounds, 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying
on the Restatement (Second) in a bankruptcy proceeding), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 778 (1996);
Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Federal common
law follows the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws . . .");
Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1st Cir. 1988) (relying on
the Restatement (Second) for a case involving the Edge Act); Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze,
820 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1987) (relying on the Restatement (Second) to determine the
applicable law for a case arising under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Aaron
Ferer & Sons v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 731 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying
the Restatement (Second) to determine which state's law would apply); Corporacion Venezo-
lana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 795 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying the
Restatement (Second) test to a case arising under the Edge Act).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 223, 225-232 (1971) (inter
vivos transactions involving land); id. §§ 236, 239-242 (succession to land); id. §§ 245-255
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cle. The remaining sections of the Restatement (Second) allow the judge
wide latitude in choosing the applicable law, ranging from mildly lim-
ited to virtually unlimited discretion. Depending on the degree of
discretion vested in the judge, the remaining sections can be divided
into three groups: (1) those that contain presumptive rules, (2) those
that contain mere pointers, and (3) those that leave the choice en-
tirely to the judge.
The first group consists of those sections that provide presump-
tive but easily displaceable rules that instruct the judge to apply the
law of one state, "unless ... some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in [section] 6.",150 This "un-
less" clause is one of the most repeated phrases in the entire Restate-
ment (Second). It is repeated in all ten of the sections devoted to
particular types of torts, 151 and in most sections devoted to particular
contracts. 15 2 The second group consists of those sections that do not
designate the applicable law, not even in a presumptive manner, but
rather provide gentle pointers mildly suggesting that the state of the
applicable law will "usually" be one particular state. Eleven of the
nineteen sections devoted to important tort issues contain such an
equivocal pointer. 153 The third group consists of those residual sec-
tions, such as section 145 for torts and section 188 for contracts, in
which the drafters make no suggestion whatsoever as to the applicable
law but leave the choice to the judge to be made on an ad hoc basis,
guided only by a deliberately malleable list of contacts contained in
(inter vivos transactions involving movables); id. §§ 260-265 (succession to movables); id.
§ 285 (divorce); id. § 286 (nullity of marriage); id. § 289 (adoption).
150. Id. § 146; see also id. §§ 146-155, 175, 189-193, 196.
151. See id. §§ 146-155.
152. See, e.g., id. §§ 189-193, 196.
153. See id. §§ 156 (tortious character of conduct), 157 (standard of care), 158 (interest
entitled to legal protection), 159 (duty owed to plaintiff), 160 (legal cause), 162 (specific
conditions of liability), 164 (contributory fault), 165 (assumption of risk), 166 (imputed
negligence), 172 (joint torts). All of these sections conclude with the adage that "[tlhe
applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury occurred." See, e.g.,
id. § 172; see also id. § 169(2) (providing that for intra-family immunity the applicable law
"will usually be the local law of the state of the parties' domicil").
In contract conflicts, section 188(3) provides that, subject to some exceptions, "[i]f
the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state,
the local law of this state will usually be applied." Id. § 188(3). Similarly, section 198(2)
provides that "[t]he capacity of a party to contract will usually be upheld if he has such
capacity under the local law of the state of his domicil," id. § 198(2), while section 199(2)
provides that contractual " [ f]ormalities which meet the requirements of the place where
the parties execute the contract will usually be acceptable." Id. § 199(2). Similar language
is to be found in many other sections of the Restatement (Second).
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sections 145154 and 188,'" respectively, and by the policies listed in
section 6. ' 56
On the surface, it would seem that the sections of the last group
allow judges more discretion than the sections of the second group,
which in turn allow more discretion than the sections of the first
group. In reality, however, all three groups are capable of providing
as much discretion as ajudge is willing to extract. Thus, if the particu-
lar case falls within the scope of a presumptive rule of the first group,
the judge may avoid the rule by invoking the "unless" clause con-
tained in that rule. If the particular issue fits within the scope of one
of the sections of the second group that provides a "pointer," the
judge may disregard the pointer by underscoring the word "usually"
contained in that pointer. As for the many cases that do not fall
within the scope of either a presumptive rule or a pointer, the judge
need not evade anything because the Restatement (Second) does not
purport to dictate a particular choice of law. For example, in a case
that falls within the general, ad hoc sections of the Restatement (Second),
such as section 145, the judge will determine the state of the most
significant relationship "under the principles stated in §6" by
"tak[ing] into account" the contacts listed illustratively in section
145.157 If the "principles stated in §6" were intended to limit the
judge's discretion, that message was lost on the vast majority ofjudges
who have applied section 6.
Even more indicative of the judiciary's inclination to retain as
much discretion as possible is the tendency of some courts expressly
to bypass the specific sections of the Restatement (Second) that contain
the mild restraints described above and directly to resort to the gen-
eral, laissez faire section 6.158 By so doing, these courts do not even
have to explain why a presumptive rule can be displaced or a pointer
ignored. In at least one respect, these courts differ little from the
courts that follow the significant-contacts approach or Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations. Although the latter two approaches differ
154. Id. § 145.
155. Id. § 188.
156. Id. § 6.
157. Id. § 145.
158. See, e.g., Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 920 S.W.2d 776, 790-91 (Tex. App. 1996) (using
§ 6 to resolve a marital property conflict and refusing to apply the more specific sections
the Restatement (Second) provides for such conflicts), wnt. granted. For a discussion of Daw-
son-Austin, see Symeonides, Tenth Annual Survey, supra note 5, at 495-99. See also PatrickJ.
Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note,
56 MD. L. REv. 1232, 1242-49 (1997).
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on the specifics from section 6 of the Restatement (Second),1 59 they nev-
ertheless provide the judge with the same virtually unlimited discre-
tion as does section 6. The truth is that, as much as the Restatement
(Second) can be rightfully accused of giving judges too much discre-
tion, all other modern approaches, except one, 1 60 give judges even
more discretion. In this sense, the whole conflicts revolution can be
described by a cynic as a judicial movement to attain and retain more
power in choice-of-law decisions. The main reason the Restatement
(Second) may be more appealing to judges is that it provides them with
as much discretion as the other modem approaches, but at the same
time, it gives the appearance of an orderly system.
B. The Restatement (Second), As Applied by Judges, Does Not Require
Hard Thinking
Despite the drafters' contrary intentions and their instructions
contained in the very valuable "comments," the Restatement (Second)
has been applied by judges in a way that does not require hard think-
ing. As explained above, in the great majority of cases, the Restatement
(Second) instructs the judge to determine the state of the most signifi-
cant relationship "under the principles stated in §6" by "taking into
account" the contacts listed in the pertinent section of the Restatement
(Second) for the type of conflict in question.161 This is supposed to be
a sophisticated, dialectical process of evaluating the policies listed in
section 6 in light of the pertinent factual contacts. It is not supposed
to be a quantitative counting, or even a so-called qualitative assess-
ment, of the factual contacts. Yet many judicial decisions do just that.
They engage in an impressionistic counting of contacts which con-
cludes with the statement that the state with the most contacts is the
state with the most significant relationship. Even the cases that go
through the trouble of examining the policies of section 6 do so more
159. The significant-contacts approach differs from section 6 of the Restatement (Second)
in that it calls for a consideration of the factual contacts alone, rather than of a set of
policies in light of the factual contacts as does the Restatement (Second). Leflar's list of
choice-influencing considerations resembles the list of policies contained in section 6(2) of
the Restatement (Second), but differs in some respects, especially in calling for the application
of the "better rule of law." See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 96 (4th
ed. 1986).
160. The only exception is New York's Neumeier rules for certain tort conflicts. See
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1972). Of the three Neumeier rules, the
first one designates the applicable law without any exception, the second rule contains a
narrow escape ("in the absence of special circumstances"), while the third rule contains a
broader escape.
161. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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in order to confirm, rather than to test, the conclusion reached on
the basis of contacts counting.
Professor Willis Reese, the chief drafter of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), observed: "[C]ourts which purport to take a 'governmental in-
terest' approach frequently engage in a judicial masquerade. In
actual practice, they decide first upon the particular rule they wish to
apply and then attribute policies to that rule that call for its applica-
tion."'16 2 Ironically, the same is equally true of courts that apply the
Restatement (Second).
C. The Restatement (Second) Is Not Ideologically "Loaded"
It is well known that many of the other "modern" approaches are
vulnerable to the criticism that they either contain built-in biases or
they provide judges with the opportunity to rationalize certain biases.
For example, interest analysis has been accused, to some extent justifi-
ably, of a distinct pro-forum, and, therefore, pro-plaintiff, pro-recovery
bias. 6 ' Professor Leflar's approach openly advocates the application
of the "better law" in certain circumstances,164 and Professor Wein-
traub's rule for tort conflicts calls for the application of the law that
favors the plaintiff in certain cases.
1 6 5
In contrast, the Restatement (Second) does not contain any such bi-
ases. The laundry list of policies contained in section 6 is an innocu-
ous list, but it is also a balanced and ideologically unbiased one. The
list begins with "the needs of the interstate and international systems"
and includes "the protection ofjustified expectations," and "certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result." '1 66 These are policies with
which no one would seriously disagree. They are policies that appeal
162. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 501, 510, 511 (1983) (footnote omitted).
163. See, e.g., Symeon Symeonides, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in American Conflicts
Law: Is There a Middle Ground?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 549, 566-67, 558-60 (1985) (citing authori-
ties).
164. See Robert A. Leflar, The Tort Provisions of the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 272 (1972) ("Whether acknowledged or not, judicial preference for the 'better law' is
tangibly present in many choice-of-law situations. For this reason, the 'better law' prefer-
ence must be added to the choice-influencing factors like in section 6.").
165. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 6.32 (2d ed.
1980) (proposing a rule with a rebuttable presumption that the law favoring the plaintiff
shall be applied in true conflict and no interest cases).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). The complete list
includes:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies
of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the pro-
tection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular
1273
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to judges who do not want to be perceived as pro-plaintiff or result
oriented.
Here again, however, one must distinguish between the drafters'
pronouncements and the degree to which these pronouncements are
actually followed byjudges. For example, despite the Restatement (Sec-
ond)'s reminder that the decisionmaker should keep in mind the
"needs of the interstate and international systems,"' 67 it does not seem
that cases applying the Restatement (Second) are any more "internation-
alist" than cases applying other approaches. In conclusion, therefore,
it can be said that one of the reasons for the Restatement (Second)'s
appeal to judges is that it provides an approach that is ideologically
neutral, yet provides ample room for accommodating almost any judi-
cial ideology.
D. The Restatement (Second) Is a Complete "System"
When Brainerd Currie denounced the traditional choice-of-law
rules, he also denounced any efforts to develop new rules.1 68 Instead,
he proposed an ad hoc method of conflicts resolution: the method of
statutory construction and interpretation employed by courts in fully
domestic cases. 161 In Currie's words: 'Just as we determine by that
process how a statute applies in time, and how it applies to marginal
domestic [cases], so we may determine how it should be applied to
cases involving foreign elements.' 70 Currie provided some general
prescriptions of how to resolve false and true conflicts as identified by
that method, but consistent with his wholesale rejection of rules, he
did not provide any specific prescriptions for conflicts in the various
areas of the law. He thought that his method was as capable of resolv-
ing tort conflicts as it was of resolving contract conflicts or conflicts in
any other area of the law. 7 ' The same basic thesis-that a methodol-
field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in
the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id.
167. Id. § 6(2)(a).
168. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 180 (1963). Cur-
rie observed:
The rules [of the traditional theory] ... have not worked and cannot be made to
work.... But the root of the trouble goes deeper. In attempting to use the rules
we encounter difficulties that stem not from the fact that the particular rules are
bad, . . . but rather from the fact that we have such rules at all.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Currie concluded: "We would be better off without choice-of-law
rules." Id. at 183.
169. See id. at 183-84.
170. Id. at 184.
171. See id. at 183-84.
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ogy or approach is all that the courts need and that a single methodol-
ogy is capable of resolving conflicts in any and all areas of the law-
has been adopted by all those contemporary theorists who reject
choice-of-law rules.
This thesis may fare well in academic halls, but it cannot be very
popular among busy practitioners and judges. When they encounter
a complicated problem of insurance, agency, or marital property law,
these practitioners or judges do not have the time or patience to ana-
lyze the problem in terms of any single, overarching choice-of-law the-
ory. They would rather start from somewhere down to earth. The
Restatement (Second) always provides them with a starting point.
Although the Restatement (Second) does not subscribe to fixed choice-
of-law rules, it also rejects the notion that a mere list of general princi-
ples, such as those provided in section 6, is sufficient to yield solutions
to conflicts in all areas of the law. Instead, the Restatement (Second)
provides choice-of-law rules not only for various types of specific tort
and contract conflicts, but also for conflicts in the areas of property,
marital property, succession, trusts, status, agency and partnership,
business corporations, and others. 7 2 Although most of these rules
are open-ended or displaceable, they provide a starting point in the
court's search for a solution. These rules are accompanied by
thoughtful comments and illustrations, both of which can further aid
the court's analysis. Thus, the fact that the Restatement (Second) offers a
complete system of rules for almost every conceivable case or issue can
only increase its usefulness to judges. 173 At the same time, the fact
that these rules are almost never confining explains the judges' will-
ingness to use them.
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 145-423 (1971); see also supra
notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
173. For example, in NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros y Maquilas de Occidente, 28 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.
1994), decided under Indiana conflicts law, Judge Ripple applied the Restatement (Second)
to an issue of agency law, although the Indiana Supreme Court had not had occasion to
apply the Restatement (Second) to agency issues and had not expressly adopted it with regard
to generic contract issues, because the Restatement (Second) "offers a provision that can be
adapted to areas for which particularized rules have not yet been developed." Id. at 583; see
also Fasa Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1334, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (predicting
that the Illinois Supreme Court would adopt the Restatement (Second) with regard to agency
issues, and applying same); Stockmen's Livestock Exch. v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 255,
257-58 (S.D. 1994) (per curiam) (applying the Restatement (Second) to an agency issue
although the court had not previously done so for contracts in general).
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E. The Restatement (Second) Carries the Prestige of the American
Law Institute
Unlike approaches proposed by individual scholars, whose per-
suasive power depends entirely on the inherent soundness of the pro-
posed approach, the Restatement (Second) carries the imprimatur of the
American Law Institute (ALI), a prestigious, collective body with a rec-
ord of success in reforming other sectors of American law. The pro-
cess of approving an ALI project contains several layers of collective
scrutiny that not only contribute to the overall quality of the final
product, but also militate against adoption of extreme or one-sided
views. Occasionally, as was the case with the Second Conflicts Restate-
ment, the end result may be the product of too many compromises
among opposing philosophies and too much of an effort to please
everybody.'" 4 From the judge's perspective, however, this alone is very
rarely a handicap. A judge who chooses to adopt the position advo-
cated by a restatement has much less explaining to do than a judge
who chooses to adopt the views advocated by any individual academic
author, even one who is considered an intellectual giant.
F The Restatement (Second) Has "Momentum"
Anyone who follows American electoral politics understands the
meaning and power of momentum. As Tables 1 and 2, above, indi-
cate, before the 1969 promulgation of the Restatement (Second), the ju-
risdictions that had abandoned the traditional approach were evenly
split between those that adopted the Restatement (Second) and those
that adopted other approaches. 7 5 Since then, the ratio between the
jurisdictions that adopted the Restatement (Second) and those that
adopted other approaches has been 2:1.1 7' During the last ten years,
the ratio has been even higher.' 77 Thus, as time passed, the appeal of
other approaches, such as interest analysis or the better-law approach,
174. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
175. In tort conflicts, eight jurisdictions had adopted the Restatement (Second) by 1969
and eight had adopted other approaches. In contract conflicts, four jurisdictions had
adopted the Restatement (Second) by 1969 and seven jurisdictions had adopted other ap-
proaches. See supra thls.1 and 2.
176. After 1969, seventeen jurisdictions adopted the Restatement (Second) for tort con-
flicts, as compared to eight jurisdictions that have adopted other approaches. See supra
tbls.1 and 2. During that same time, twenty-one jurisdictions embraced the Restatement
(Second) for contract conflicts, while ten jurisdictions chose other approaches. See supra
tbls.1 and 2.
177. From 1988 to 1997, five jurisdictions adopted the Restatement (Second) in tort con-
flicts as compared to one jurisdiction that adopted another approach, and nine jurisdic-
tions adopted the Restatement (Second) for contract conflicts as compared with four
jurisdictions that adopted other approaches. See supra tbls.1 and 2.
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has subsided, and the appeal of the Restatement (Second) has increased.
It seems that, at this point, the Restatement (Second) has enough mo-
mentum to justify a prediction that, if any of the jurisdictions that
continue to adhere to the traditional theory chooses to abandon that
theory, it will likely adopt the Restatement (Second).178
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE -RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TO AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
Because the dominance of the Restatement (Second) in the Ameri-
can conflicts scene is now demonstrably clear, the question arises: Is
this a positive development for American conflicts law? As this Arti-
cle's title suggests, I consider the Restatement (Second)'s contribution to
be a mixed blessing.
The contribution of the Restatement (Second) has been positive to
the extent that it has facilitated the abandonment of the traditional
rules of lex loci delicti and lex loci contractus and all the artificial and
mechanical logic on which those rules were based and with which they
were surrounded. It is of course true that the traditional theory had
come under severe academic attacks even before 1953, the year the
ALI began the process of drafting a new conflicts restatement, and
certainly before 1969, the year the Restatement (Second) was officially
promulgated. Before 1953, however, these academic attacks had
made only marginal inroads in judicial opinions. From 1953 and
thereafter, these inroads increased sufficiently, so that by 1966 five
jurisdictions had abandoned the traditional theory in tort conflicts,
led by the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson.'79
Although none of these jurisdictions adopted the Restatement (Sec-
ond),' Babcock was at least influenced in part by the Restatement (Sec-
ond), which was then in "Tentative Draft" form.18 1 More importantly,
between 1967 and 1969, when the ALI publicized the Proposed Official
Drafts of the Restatement (Second), eleven more jurisdictions abandoned
the traditional theory for torts and eight of them adopted these
178. The states more likely to do so in the near future are: Maryland and Tennessee for
contract conflicts, West Virginia for tort conflicts, and Kansas for both contract and tort
conflicts.
179. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); see supra note 8 and accompanying text. The other
four jurisdictions were Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and Puerto Rico. See
supra tbl.1.
180. See supra tbl.l.
181. See Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84 (relying on a 1960 Tentative Draft of the Restate-
ment (Second)).
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drafts.1 12 This is not to say that the Restatement (Second) caused the
conflicts revolution. The Restatement (Second) was certainly a major
contributing factor in the decisions of many courts to abandon the
traditional theory, however. It is entirely possible that, had the ALI
not abandoned the First Restatement, the ranks of the revolutionaries
during the 1960s would have been much more sparse. They would
have included New York, California, and perhaps a few other "pro-
gressive" states, but most probably they would not have included states
as diverse as Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, or Mississippi. It is unlikely
that these states would have adopted interest analysis or the better-law
approach. It is more likely that they would have retained the tradi-
tional theory while increasing their use of traditional escape devices.
Thus, the contribution of the Restatement (Second) in the decisions
of the majority of states to abandon the traditional theory should not
be questioned. It should also be beyond question that the abandon-
ment of the traditional theory was a positive and necessary develop-
ment in American conflicts law. What is not beyond question,
however, is whether the decision of these states to adopt as a replace-
ment the particular approach of the Restatement (Second) is a positive
development. Naturally, the answer depends on one's opinion of the
Restatement (Second). Because my overall opinion of the Restatement
(Second) is tempered by its various flaws, my assessment of this develop-
ment cannot be entirely positive.
I would like to continue with the positive, however. One other
positive contribution of the Restatement (Second) is that it has helped to
avoid polarization among American courts and has laid the founda-
tion for a new synthesis to be formed from competing choice-of-law
theories. Unlike the First Restatement, whose rigidity and dogmatism
caused the revolution, the Restatement (Second), because of its lack of
dogmatism and its flexible and compromissory content, has helped to
produce a benign, albeit uncertain, evolution. Had the Restatement
(Second) aspired for ideological purity rather than philosophical plu-
ralism, it would have pleased some of its academic critics but it would
have been far less attractive to judges. Its followers would have been
more devoted, but fewer, and polarization among American courts
would have been inevitable.
To date, this polarization has been avoided. As the majority of
American courts abandoned the old dogma, they have not moved in a
182. These eight jurisdictions were: Kentucky, Oregon, and the District of Columbia in
1967; Alaska, Arizona, Iowa, and Mississippi in 1968; and Missouri in 1969. See supra tbl.1.
The first three jurisdictions later abandoned the Restatement (Second) in favor of other ap-
proaches. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
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single direction, but at least they have moved in parallel, and in their
minds fungible, directions, one of which is that of the Restatement (Sec-
ond). As much as we academics tend to accentuate the differences
between these directions, the courts tend to do the opposite. For ex-
ample, the fact that judges tend to move so easily from the Restatement
(Second) to other policy-based analyses suggests that in their minds,
correctly or not, these analyses do not differ in essential respects.
Although this phenomenon of eclecticism or pluralism des methods has
been vilified by academic critics,' it is a fact of life. We can continue
to decry this phenomenon, or we can exploit its positive aspects.
For my part, I continue to subscribe to the hope that this eclecti-
cism can become the basis for a productive synthesis of the American
conflicts experience of the last twenty-five years. Seventeen years ago,
in my first written critique of the Restatement (Second), I wrote that the
Restatement (Second) was "broad enough to encompass almost all mod-
ern American approaches,"18 4 and that it could provide the most ap-
propriate forum for a compromise among these approaches. I
concluded: "Far from being regretable, this feature of the Restate-
ment may, in the long run, prove its basic virtue. In time it may ap-
pear that eclecticism, perhaps not necessarily the particular
eclecticism of the Restatement Second .... is the only way out of the
conflicts crisis." 185
The crisis to which I referred was the crisis that brought about the
revolution. Now we are in the midst of another, less obvious crisis,
brought about by the revolution's apparent victory and the anarchy
that tends to follow many revolutions. That victory will be wasted if we
allow anarchy to set in for too long, if we continue to behave like
revolutionary chieftains rather than statesmen, if we do not proceed
to the next step of consolidating the gains of the revolution.
VI. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
In 1972, one year after the Restatement (Second) was published, its
chief drafter, Professor Willis Reese, postulated that the principal
question of that time in American conflicts law was "whether we
should have rules or an approach."' 86 His own answer was that "the
183. See, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mish-
mash?, 34 MERCER L. REv. 645, 646 (1983).
184. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW OF THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
CHOICE OF LAW 39 (1980).
185. Id. at 45-46 (footnote omitted).
186. Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 315
(1972).
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formulation of rules should be as much an objective in choice of law
as it is in other areas of law."' 8 7 Reese also knew, however, that at that
time tort and contract conflicts were not yet ripe for such rules.1 8
This is why in these two areas the Restatement (Second) attempted no
more than to "provide formulations that . . .were broad enough to
permit further development in the law."1 9 Reese retained the firm
hope, however, that in due time these formulations would permit the
development of "more definite ' 90 or "precise ' choice-of-law rules.
That same year, Professor Robert Leflar, another legend of Amer-
ican conflicts law and one of the drafters of the Restatement (Second)'s
chapter on torts, acknowledged that, although the Restatement (Second)
"looked forward" 192 and was "firm[ly] dedicat[ed] to continuing
growth,"1 9 it did not state the law of the future. Leflar said: "[The
Restatement (Second)] does not state the law of 1980, and we may have
to wait until after 1980 to see what that law is to be .... Wherever it
leaves us, we go on from there." '9 4
Well, we are "there" now! What we see cannot be too pleasing to
those who believe in "continuing growth." The Restatement (Second)
has facilitated the break away from the traditional rules of lex loci delicti
and lex loci contractus, but as the Restatement (Second)'s critics predicted
and as its drafters acknowledged, it has also brought about an in-
creased degree of unevenness and unpredictability. The question,
therefore, is: Where do we go from "here?"
I submit that the next natural step is to begin the process of pre-
paring for a third conflicts restatement. This restatement will contain
rules derived from the experience of the first twenty-five years, the
rules for which Reese had aspired. To be sure, these rules cannot be
like the rules of the First Restatement, but they should be more than the
nonrules of the Restatement (Second). The new rules should be narrow,
issue-by-issue, content-oriented rules, grounded on experience rather
than on dogma. They should contain appropriate escapes, but they
187. Willis L.M. Reese, General Course on Private International Law, 150 RECUEIL DES CoURS
1, 61 (1976-1I).
188. See Reese, supra note 162, at 518-19.
189. Id. at 519.
190. Id. at 518 (stating that tort and contract conflicts were not as yet susceptible to
"hard and fast rules," but expressing the hope that "it will be possible to state more definite
rules at some time in the future"); see also id. at 508.
191. Reese, supra note 187, at 62.
192. Leflar, supra note 164, at 267.
193. Id. at 268.
194. Id. at 278.
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should not be as easily displaceable as the "rules" of the Restatement
(Second).1 95
Is it too early for such an endeavor? The First Conflicts Restatement
was in existence for only nineteen years before the ALl publicized the
first tentative draft of what later became the Restatement (Second). The
Restatement (Second) has already been in existence for twenty-seven
years, and we must acknowledge, it has been vastly more successful
than its predecessor. Ironically, however, although the First Restate-
ment was rightfully replaced because it was unsuccessful, the Restate-
ment (Second) should be replaced because it has been successful. The
Restatement (Second) was intended to be and was "a transitional
work."' 9 6 It was "written during a time of turmoil and crisis... when
rival theories were being fiercely debated, and when serious doubt was
expressed about the practicality, and indeed the desirability, of having
any rules at all."' 9 7 The Restatement (Second) has accomplished this
transitional task of leading American courts away from the traditional
dogma and through the first stages of experimentation with the new
ideas generated by the conflicts revolution, many of which were incor-
porated into the Restatement (Second). Now is the time to move to the
next step.
Nevertheless, even if we could hope for a consensus about the
desirability of attempting to articulate new rules, can we hope for any
consensus of what these rules will be? If the process of drafting a new
restatement will be as open and as long as that of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), this consensus should not be beyond our reach. A careful analy-
sis of the results reached by cases in the last couple of decades can
produce several rules that are likely to win wider endorsement. As a
starting point, I can suggest the following rules for tort conflicts: (1)
applying the law of the parties' common domicile in loss-distribution
conflicts;19 s (2) applying the law of the place where both the conduct
and the injury occurred in conduct-regulation conflicts;19 9 and (3) al-
lowing punitive damages if such damages are imposed by the law of
195. See supra notes 188-191 and accompanying text.
196. Reese, supra note 162, at 519.
197. Id. at 518-19.
198. For a statutory expression of such a rule, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544(1) (West
1994). For supporting rationale, and precodification cases supporting such a rule, see the
cases discussed in Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An
Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REv. 677, 715-25 (1992) [hereinafter Symeonides, An Exegesis]. For
cases decided since the effective date of the Louisiana codification, see Symeon C. Symeo-
nides, Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two "Surprises, "54 LA. L. REv. 497, 505-13 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Symeonides, Two Surprises]; see also supra note 160 (discussing the first Neumeier rule).
199. For a statutory expression of this rule, see LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 3543(1) (West
1994). For supporting rationale, see Symeonides, An Exegesis, supra note 198, at 705-12.
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any two of the following places: the place of conduct, place of injury,
or the defendant's domicile. 200 A few other rules, also derived from
current judicial practice, can win wider acceptance, provided they are
armored with appropriate escapes.
The last question is whether these or any other rules are likely to
be accepted by the courts. After all, the main reason so many courts
endorsed the Restatement (Second) is because it gave them almost unlim-
ited discretion. If the third restatement is to be a "rule" system, are
the courts likely to adopt it and thus surrender the vast discretion they
have enjoyed under the Restatement (Second)?
First, the third restatement should not be envisioned as a system
of rigid, inflexible rules, but rather as a network of less easily displace-
able rules-rules that provide more predictability than the Restatement
(Second), yet authorize deviations in appropriate cases.
Second, the courts' current infatuation with flexible, rudderless
approaches should not be expected to last forever. If history is any
indication, that too shall pass.2" 1 History does not move in complete
cycles, but it does move in spirals. Even Joseph Beale acknowledged
that "[t]he whole history.., of law is the history of alternate efforts to
render the law more certain and to render it more flexible. ' 20 2 Cur-
For cases decided since the effective date of the Louisiana codification, see Symeonides,
Two Surprises, supra note 198, at 513-17.
200. For a statutory expression of this rule, see LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3546 (West
1994). For supporting rationale, see Symeonides, An Exegesis, supra note 198, at 73542. In
the meantime, this rule has also been adopted by the ALI in its complex litigation project.
See American Law Institute, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS § 6.06 (1994). For pertinent discussion, see Symeon C. Symeonides, The AL/'s
Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L. Rv. 843, 868-71 (1994).
201. A good example on point is the experience of the New York courts in tort conflicts.
After initiating the revolution in Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963), the New
York Court of Appeals became disillusioned with the uncertainty experienced by the lower
courts and took it upon itself to articulate a set of choice-of-law rules in Neumeier v. Kuehner,
286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1972). For a discussion of a more general trend to return to
rules, or perhaps of a nostalgia for rules, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Exception Clauses in
American Conflicts Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 813, 817-18, 861-64 (1994).
202. 1JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 50 (1935). Beale contin-
ued in language which, although intended to describe the pre-Beale era, could also de-
scribe the post-Beale era:
[T]o a period of strict law, where the one purpose of law is to secure exactness
and certainty, succeeds a period of equity and natural law in which the purpose is
to infuse law with an element of justice and morality and therefore to temper the
exactness of the strict law with a flexibility that may enable it to perform its func-
tion more justly. This in turn is succeeded by a period of maturity in which the
flexibility of the period of equity and natural law is to a degree restrained by
legalizing the broadness of equitable relief and bringing that too under precepts
consisting of standards and principles so as to make it more certain. It is to be
noticed that in this period the law does not go back to its earlier exactness, but
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rently, we are at a point where conflicts law is too flexible. There will
come a point, however, at which the courts will be receptive to, per-
haps even crave for, more certainty. Although they would not want a
return to the artificial and superficial certainty of Beale's First Restate-
ment, they will be receptive to a new restatement that provides an ap-
propriate equilibrium between certainty and flexibility.
By beginning now the process of drafting a third conflicts restate-
ment, the ALI can position itself at the right place at the right time to
provide the pole around which American courts will congregate in
building the conflicts law of the twenty-first century.
In the meantime, let us give the Restatement (Second) its due by
answering the rhetorical question posed at the beginning of this Arti-
cle: Thanks in large part to the Restatement (Second), we can say that
"we are better off today than we were twenty-five years ago." Can we do
better? I believe that we can, and we should try.
remains with a more flexible content than the strict law, although it has gained in
certainty over the period of natural law. This in turn is followed by a period in
which again the freer administration of law is emphasized; a period in which we
now live, where the rules and principles of law cause impatience if too fixed in
their application, and a desire exists to individualize their operation.
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